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Event Set × Event Set designs were used to study the rotating screen paradigm intro-
duced by Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman (1985). In Experiment 1, 36
5½-month-old infants were habituated to a screen rotating 180° with no block, a
screen rotating 120° up to a block, or a screen rotating 180° up to and seemingly
through a block. All infants were then tested on the same 3 events and also a screen ro-
tating 120° with no block. The results indicate that infants are using novelty and fa-
miliarity preference to determine their looking times. To confirm this, in Experiment
2, 52 5½-month-old infants were familiarized on either 3 or 7 trials to a screen rotating
180° with no block or a screen rotating 120° with no block. All infants were then
tested on the same test events as in Experiment 1. Infants with fewer familiarization
trials were more likely to prefer the familiar rotation event. The results of these 2 ex-
periments indicate that infants did not use the possibility or impossibility of events but
instead used familiarity or novelty relations between the habituation events and the
test events to determine their looking times, and suggest that the Baillargeon et al.
study should not be interpreted as indicating object permanence or solidity knowl-
edge in young infants.
In the decade and a half since its publication, the study of object permanence in
5-month-old infants by Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman (1985) has been fre-
quently cited in research and theoretical articles and plays a supportive role in vari-
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ous formulations of the young infant’s cognitive capacities. In that study,
5-month-old infants were familiarized with a screen moving back and forth 180° in
the manner of a drawbridge. The infants were then shown two events. In one event,
the screen repeatedly started out flat on the table pointing toward the infant, rising
up away from the infant and approaching a box, occluding the box, stopping at the
box, and returning, disclosing that the box is still there. In the other event, the screen
repeatedly started out flat on the table pointing toward the infant, rising up away
from the infant and approaching a box, occluding the box, and then apparently per-
forming the impossible by continuing on downward away from the infant, travers-
ing 180°, and seemingly passing through the space occupied by the box until flat on
the table, and then returning, disclosing that the box is still there. The infants looked
longer at the apparently impossible event. The longer looking usually has been in-
terpreted in terms of the infants expecting the screen to stop at the box, being sur-
prised or puzzled at its not stopping, and therefore looking longer. This interpreta-
tion, in turn, has supported the conclusion that these infants must know that the box
continues to exist after it is occluded and must know that one solid object cannot
pass through another or there would be no surprise.
Piaget (1954) concluded that young infants do not have object permanence. He
showed that infants this age and even some months older will not displace an
occluder that is concealing an object that the infant would otherwise reach for.
There is a discrepancy between this often replicated finding of Piaget and the ap-
parent knowledge of object permanence in the drawbridge experiment and other
looking-time experiments that appear to demonstrate object permanence in young
infants (Baillargeon, 1993; Baillargeon & Graber, 1987; Kellman & Spelke, 1983;
Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992). The usual response to this
discrepancy is to argue that in young infants looking time is a more sensitive mea-
sure of the infant’s knowledge and that the infant does not displace the occluder to
get the occluded object because he or she cannot coordinate the displacement ac-
tion with the reaching action: He or she cannot coordinate the means with the ends.
However, recent work suggests that the means–ends explanation probably will not
be sufficient to account for failures to reach for occluded objects (Munakata,
McClelland, Johnson, & Siegler, 1997; Shinskey, 1999).
The claim that young infants have object permanence has not been received
with universal enthusiasm (Fischer & Bidell, 1991). Haith (1988) suggested con-
cern for artifacts and short-lived afterimages as possible explanations for some of
the results indicating object permanence. Meltzoff and Moore (1998) argued that
these experiments may show “representation of past events” but not “object per-
manence” (p. 215). That is, they may be based on infants detecting a relation be-
tween the familiarized material and the test material without necessitating object
permanence. Along similar lines, Bogartz, Shinskey, and Speaker (1997) and
Bogartz and Shinskey (1998) suggested that studies that appear to reveal object
permanence and a sophisticated knowledge of what is possible and what is impos-
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sible may perhaps more parsimoniously be understood in terms of well-known and
well-documented preferences for novel events under some circumstances and for
familiar events under others (for documentation of familiarity preferences in in-
fants, see Hunter & Ames, 1988; Hunter, Ross, & Ames, 1982; Rose, Gottfried,
Melloy-Carminar, & Bridger, 1982). In the typical looking-time experiment, the
infant is habituated or familiarized to one stimulus event and then is tested on two
events. Elsewhere (Bogartz & Shinskey, 1998; Bogartz et al., 1997), we have de-
tailed the problems with this design that tend to confound possibility–impossiblity
preference with novelty–familiarity preference. We have also shown how using
the Event Set × Event Set design together with a new class of models that we have
introduced, permits the explicit statistical test of whether the impossibility of
events is having an effect on looking time. This new approach allows for the possi-
bility that looking time differences result from the novelty or familiarity relations
between the familiarization events and the test events rather than as a result of sur-
prise on the part of the infant to so-called impossible events.
In the Event Set × Event Set design, instead of infants being familiarized to one
event and then tested on two others, all of the events being used are candidates for
both the familiarization or habituation stage and the test stage of the experiment.
This permits a study of the effect of the relation between the familiarized–habituated
event and the test event on test event looking times. We can illustrate how the draw-
bridge experiment of Baillargeon et al. (1985) can be recast as an Event Set × Event
Set design. Let the familiarization event and the two test events in that design be de-
noted by 180, 120 + B, and 180 + B. In this notation, the numbers 180 or 120 indicate
the degrees through which the occluding screen rotates away from the infant before
reversing direction, and the +B appended to the number indicates that a block was
placed beyond the screen’s axis of rotation such that a 120° rotation would bring the
screen up to the location of the block and a 180° rotation would cause the block to
pass completely through the space occupied by the block. Thus, the block is oc-
cludedwhen thescreen rotatesawayfromthe infantand thendisoccludedwhen it ro-
tates back toward the infant. (Of course, on 180 + B trials the experimenter removes
the block after it is occluded so that the impossible event can occur and then replaces
the block before the disocclusion occurs.) Each of these events would serve as the fa-
miliarization event for one third of the participants, forming a between-participant
factor of the design. Following familiarization, each infant would be tested on all of
the events in random order, forming a within-participants factor of the design. In the
design thatweactuallyused inExperiment1, anadditional eventdenotedby120and
consisting of the screen repeatedly rotating 120° and back, but with no block present
and then returning to its starting position, was added as a fourth level of the
within-participants factor. Thus the design is as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 also shows the predictions from a general model that can be reduced to
two theoretically relevant special cases. In the general model, the level of looking
(L) is increased or decreased by amounts specific to two kinds of effects. The first
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kind results from the comparison of the current event with the stored information
about the event to which the infant was familiarized or habituated. One component
of this first kind of effect has to do with the relation of the perceived screen to the
screen in the habituation event; specifically, it is the effect of seeing a change in the
rotation of the screen (CS). The other component has to do with the relation of the
perceived block to the block in the habituation event; it is the effect of seeing a
change in the presence of a block (CB). For each of these two parameters, a posi-
tive value reflects a novelty preference and a negative value reflects a familiarity
preference. A particular virtue of this modeling approach is that it leaves the ques-
tion open as to which type of preference exists for a given individual and regards
the question as one of parameter estimation rather than assuming automatically
that infants always prefer the novel stimulus.
The second kind of effect is an increase in the amount of looking due to surprise
at the occurrence of an impossible event (P). In Figure 1, a positive value of P de-
notes preference for looking at the impossible event. Under the general model,
looking-time effects can be due to both surprise at impossibility and to the nov-
elty–familiarity relations between the familiarization or habituation events and the
test trial events. Thus, for example, the model asserts that looking at a 120 + B test
trial following habituation to a 180 trial would be described by the equation
Looking time = L + CS + CB – P
because there was a change in the screen from 120 to 180, a change from block pres-
ent to block absent, and there was nothing impossible about the screen rotating 120°
up to but not through the block.
If all that determines the differences in looking time is whether the event being
looked at is possible or impossible, then, CB = CS = 0 and P > 0. This may be the case
if the infant represents theoccludedblock,knowsthat the rotatingscreencannotpass
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FIGURE 1 The Event Set × Event Set design for Experiment 1, using the Baillargeon et al.
(1985) stimuli. Note. L = the general level of looking; CS = the effect of a change in the screen
rotation condition from 180 on habituation to 120 on test or vice versa; –CS = the effect of no
change; CB = the effect of a change in the block condition from presence of block during habitu-
ation to absence of block during test or vice versa; –CB = the effect of no change; P = the effect of
an impossible event on the test trial; –P = the effect of a possible event on the test trial.
through the block, is surprised when it appears to do so on the 180 + B trials, and
therefore looks longer. We call this the possibility model and take it to represent the
assumptionsheldbyBaillargeonetal. (1985).On theotherhand, suppose that the in-
fant has no knowledge concerning what is possible and what is impossible, so that P
= 0. Instead, looking time is determined by the relation between the test event and the
familiarization–habituation event. In this case, a quantity CB is added to general
level of looking, L, when there is a change from block present in the familiariza-
tion–habituation event to block absent in the test event, or vice versa. When there is
no change in block presence from the familiarization–habituation event to the test
event, then that quantity CB is subtracted. Similarly, a quantity CS is added to the
general level of looking, L, when there is a change in the amount of rotation of the
screen from the familiarization–habituation event to the test event, but when there is
no change in the amount of screen rotation, then that quantity CS is subtracted. The
sign of the CB and CS parameters are not necessarily the same for all infants. We call
this a novelty–familiarity comparison model.
Under the possibility model, the matrix of predicted values becomes that shown
in Figure 2A. Under the novelty–familiarity comparison model, the matrix of pre-
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FIGURE 2 The matrix of predicted values under (A) the possibility model and (B) the nov-
elty–familiarity comparison model. Note. L = the general level of looking; CS = the effect of a
change in the screen rotation condition from 180 on habituation to 120 on test or vice versa; –CS
= the effect of no change; CB = the effect of a change in the block condition from presence of
block during habituation to absence of block during test or vice versa; –CB = the effect of no
change; P = the effect of an impossible event on the test trial; –P = the effect of a possible event on
the test trial.
dicted values becomes that shown in Figure 2B. The two matrices of predicted val-
ues provide clearly distinct predictions that enable an empirical test to determine
which model better fits the data. A third case, of course, is one in which both the
possibility–impossiblity effects and the novelty–familiarity preference effects are
playing a role in determining looking time. This case is represented in Figure 1.
Inspection of the second and third cells in Row 1 of the matrix in Figure 2B
shows that the two cells constitute a replication of the Baillargeon et al. (1985) test
trials on the possible and impossible events following habituation to the 180°
screen without a block. Consider the values in these two cells that are predicted by
the novelty–familiarity comparison model. If the value of CS is negative, then the
infant will look longer at the 180 + B event than at the 120 + B event. A negative
value of CS is interpreted as a preference for the familiar screen rotation rather
than for the novel one. From our perspective, this familiarity preference occurs be-
cause the infant is not finished forming a stable representation of the 180° rotation.
The model reveals that the familiarity preference effect for the screen rotation
can produce the type of looking-time difference found by Baillargeon et al. (1985).
Under this analysis, the difference occurs not because the infant knows what is
possible and what is impossible and not because the infant knows that the block
continues to exist behind the occluding screen, but instead, because of a familiarity
preference effect, which, in the Baillargeon et al. study, is confounded with the
possibility–impossibility variable. Thus, we see that the data from the Baillargeon
et al. study cannot decide between the two models because both models can predict
the obtained result. The purpose of Experiment 1 is to use the Event Set × Event
Set design in Figure 1 to determine which of these competing models better de-
scribes infant looking.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants. Thirty-six, full-term 5½-month-old infants (16 girls, 20 boys)
from the Amherst, Massachusetts, area participated in the study. The infants ranged
in age from 5 months 3 days to 6 months 6 days, with a mean of 5 months 19 days.
Nine additional infants were tested but were not included in the sample, 7 because
of fussiness, 1 because of experimenter error, and 1 because of inattention. Partici-
pants were recruited from state birth records. Parents were contacted by mail and a
subsequent telephone call. Participation was voluntary.
Apparatus. Testing took place in a brightly lit experimental room (300 cm ×
225 cm). A large wooden stage (203 cm × 141 cm × 70 cm) was located in the center
of the room. The displays were presented within a wooden, three-sided box (87 cm
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× 89.5 cm × 75.5 cm), painted black and set inside the stage. The screen apparatus
was placed on a wooden platform such that the infant’s eye level was approxi-
mately at the center of the screen. The screen apparatus consisted of a yellow tis-
sue-covered foam core board (20 cm × 16 cm) attached to a rotating rod mounted at
the center of a black painted wooden box (22.5 cm × 35.5 cm × 9.5 cm) below it.
The screen was rotated by a motor inside the black box and was operated by the ex-
perimenter using a keyboard interface to an IBM computer. The screen could travel
from 0° to 120° and back in 8 sec, or from 0° to 180° and back in 12 sec. The block
consisted of a foam core board (17 cm × 11 cm) covered with red tissue on which
gold stars were pasted. The back of the block was painted black so that it could not
be seen in its resting position flat on the surface of the black box below it. The block
was raised on a rod to its 90° standing position with clear fishing line pulled by the
experimenter through a hole in the back wall of the stage. The fishing line was at-
tached to a small handle on the side of the black box, and the handle was attached to
the rotating rod. A black cloth curtain was lowered over the stage opening between
trials. The curtain had pictures of infants’ faces attached to it, in an attempt to pre-
vent the infant from becoming fussy during intertrial intervals.
A video camera focused on the infant’s face was centered behind the back wall
of the box, just above the floor of the box, so that only the lens protruding through a
hole in the back wall was visible to the infant. A second camera on a tripod above
and behind the infant focused on the displays on the stage. The video monitor for
the camera focusing on the infant’s face was used by the observer in a separate ad-
jacent observation room. Both the displays and the infant’s looking behavior were
recorded and served to check on the accuracy of looking times and the reliability of
interobserver ratings. Looking times were recorded online using a keyboard inter-
face to a Macintosh SE/30 computer operated by the observer in a separate room.
This observer was blind to the experimental events manipulated by the experi-
menter in the adjacent room and could see only the infant’s face on the video moni-
tor in the observation room.
Displays. Four displays were presented to the infants. Each display began
with the screen in its resting position at 0°, flat on the surface of the black box below
it. The 180 display consisted of the screen moving by itself, back and forth in a 180°
arc, toward and away from the infant, so that it took 12 sec to complete the rotation
from 0° to 180° and back again. In the 180 + B display, the impossible event, the red
block was visible for the first 1 sec of the rotation; the screen moved all the way to
180° as if the block were not there, and then the screen moved back toward 0°, with
the block becoming visible again for the last 1 sec of the rotation. This was accom-
plished by having the experimenter drop the block to its resting position flat against
the surface of the black box below it during the middle portion of the 12-sec rota-
tion. In the 120 + B display, the red block was visible for the first 1 sec of the rota-
tion; the screen rotated up to the position of the block at 120° and then reversed its
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direction, with the red block becoming visible again for the last 1 sec of the rotation.
In the 120 display, the block was not present, and the screen rotated 120° away from
the infant and then back to 0°. The 180, 180 + B, and 120 + B displays served as be-
tween-participant habituation events. The 120 display was added to these three to
make four within-participants test events.
Design. The design was a 3 (habituation events, between-participants) × 4
(test events, within-participants) factorial design. Twelve participants were habitu-
ated to the 180 display, 12 to the 180 + B impossible display, and 12 to the 120 + B
display. Following habituation, each infant was presented with four test trials, one
for each of the four test displays. The event sequences on the four test trials were
constrained such that if the infant was habituated to a screen motion of 180°, then
the first test trial would use a screen motion of 120°, and vice versa. Within each ha-
bituation group, this constraint allowed for 12 possible test trial event sequences.
Within each of the three groups of 12 infants, each infant received a different one of
these test trial sequences of the four test displays.
Procedure. The infant was placed in an infant seat attached to a table so that
the infant’s face was approximately 100 cm from the stimuli, and the infant’s eye
level was approximately 40 cm above the floor of the box. The parent sat to the in-
fant’s right with his or her back to the stage. The parent was asked not to look at the
displays, so as not to influence the infant’s behavior, and not to interact with the in-
fant unless the infant became fussy.
Each trial began with the raising of the curtain. In the two displays involving the
block, the block was presented first until the infant had been judged to look at it,
and then the screen began moving. Looking time started with the first look at the
block after the curtain rose. In the two displays not involving the block, the screen
did not begin moving until the infant was judged to be looking toward the appara-
tus on the stage. Looking time and the trial ended when the infant was judged to
look away from the display for 2 consecutive sec after looking for at least 4 cumu-
lative sec, or to look for a total of 120 sec. Habituation trials continued until 14 tri-
als were presented, or until the habituation criterion was met: total looking time on
three consecutive trials that was less than 50% of the sum of the looking times on
the first three trials exceeding 12 sec. The end of each trial was signaled by a beep
from the computer and the experimenter lowered the curtain on signal from the
computer. The intertrial interval for habituation trials was approximately 15 sec.
When the computer signaled the end of the last habituation trial, the curtain
dropped and two pretest trials were presented. The pretest trials are included be-
cause they were included in the experiment by Baillargeon et al. (1985). In the pre-
test trials, the curtain was raised to reveal the red block standing alone. The screen
lay flat against the floor of the alley with the block clearly visible behind it. The
curtain was dropped when the infant had been judged to look at the block for 3 cu-
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mulative sec. At the end of the second pretest trial, the curtain was dropped and the
test trials began. The intertrial interval for test trials was approximately 10.5 sec
(based on the measurement of 25% of the intertrial intervals). The infant received
four test trials so that each test display was seen once. As in the habituation phase,
trials ended when the infant was judged to look away for 2 sec after looking for at
least 4 cumulative sec, or to look for a total of 120 sec.
Results
Interobserver reliability. All of the 36 infants except 1 were scored by two
observers. Interobserver reliability was assessed by determining the correlation be-
tween the judged total looking time on each of the first four test trials for one ob-
server (Jeanne L. Shinskey) and those for the other (Richard S. Bogartz). The corre-
lation was .992 and compares favorably with previous such values for our lab that
have been around .98. The slope of the regression line was .996, indicating that, ex-
cept for an additive constant, the two observers were judging the looking times
equivalently.
Habituation. The mean number of trials to criterion for the 180, 180 + B, and
120 + B habituation groups were 7.50, 6.75, and 7.58, respectively. These means
did not differ significantly, F(2, 33) = .80, p = .46. The mean total looking times
during habituation for the 180, 180 + B, and 120 + B habituation groups were
244.34 sec, 169.69 sec, and 243.45 sec, respectively. The difference between the
means was marginally significant, F(2, 33) = 3.067, p = .06. The difference results
from there being less total looking to 180 + B than to the other two events. It is inter-
esting to note that the 180 + B condition involves habituation to the impossible
event of the screen appearing to pass right through the block. If such an impossible
event is surprising to the infant, one would expect that habituation would take lon-
ger, but the data do not lend any support to that prediction. This is consistent with
other previous failures to find slower habituation to the impossible event (Bogartz
& Shinskey, 1998; Bogartz et al., 1997). The trials to criterion were essentially the
same for both the 180 and the 180 + B conditions and the difference in total looking
time, if real, is in the wrong direction.
Rivera, Wakeley, and Langer (1999) claimed that infants prefer to look at
screen rotations that have more motion (180°) rather than at those with less motion
(120°). The habituation trial looking times obtained in this experiment do not sup-
port that claim.
Test trials. Table 1 shows the results of fitting the model in Figure 2B to the
test trial data. This was done using multiple regression including an effect for indi-
vidual participants and a trials effect. Bogartz et al. (1997) provided a tutorial on the
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procedures but they did not show how to include a trials effect. There are four test
trials. The trial effect for Test Trial i (i = 1–4) is defined as the mean looking time for
Test Trial i minus the overall mean looking time. Thus, the test trial effects sum to
zero as in a fixed-effects factor in the analysis of variance (ANOVA); including the
test trial effects in the regression analysis extracts from error the variability due to
the responses occurring on different trials. The results in Table 1 show that the
model is fitting the data closely and that there is substantial variability from cell to
cell that is predicted by the model parameters, CB and CS. The mean absolute devi-
ation of observed means from predicted means is 1.53 sec. The regression analysis
yielded an R2 of .624 which is significant, F(39, 105) = 12.18, p = .00.
To test the effect of the theoretical variables CB and CS, the model containing
only L, participants, and trials was fit and the difference between the model includ-
ing CB and CS and the model excluding CB and CS was tested. The difference was
statistically significant, F(2, 105) = 13.69, p = .00, supporting the model in Figure
2B.
There are two ways to test whether the possibility–impossibility variable is
playing a part. The first is to compare the full model in Figure 1 plus participants
and trials effects against the model in Figure 2B plus participants and trials effects.
Because the model in Figure 2B is a special case of the full model, this test is done
using the difference between the sum of squares for regression under the full
model and the sum of squares for regression under Figure 2B. This difference, di-
vided by the difference in the number of parameters, one, is a mean square that can
be divided by the mean square for error under the full model to obtain an F ratio.
When this was done, the obtained F(1, 104) = .0097, p = .92 was not significant, in-
dicating that the P parameter accounted for no additional variance beyond that ac-
counted for by the model in Figure 2B.
To protect against the possibility that the CB and CS effects are correlated with
the P effects and are thus soaking up variance that would otherwise be accounted
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TABLE 1
Observed and Predicted Mean Looking Times For the Event Set × Event Set Design in
Figure 2B
Group 180 120 + B 180 + B 120
180
Observed 11.04 18.71 13.89 14.21
Predicted 11.24 17.53 12.68 16.39
120 + B
Observed 20.35 10.39 18.86 16.44
Predicted 20.27 12.92 18.96 13.90
180 + B
Observed 13.33 17.60 12.09 20.11
Predicted 12.16 19.41 12.16 19.41
for by the P variable, the second way to test whether the P variable is playing a part
is to exclude the variables CB and CS from the analysis and test whether the model
including P, participants, and trial effects does significantly better than the model
including only participants and trials effects. When this was done, the obtained
F(1, 106) = .03, p = .86, was not significant, indicating that the P parameter ac-
counted for no additional variance beyond that accounted for using only the partic-
ipant effects and the trials effects.
Inspection of Table 1 reveals some interesting aspects of the data. As would be
expected from the model in Figure 2B, the longest looking times are observed when
there is a combined change from one screen rotation to the other and from one block
condition to the other. Thus, for example, going from 120 + B to 180 or from 180 + B
to 120 produces the longest looking times. This suggests that there is both a screen
novelty and a block novelty preference in these infants, at least on average.
Because the first row of Table 1 includes a replication of the Baillargeon et al.
(1985) conditions, namely testing on 120 + B and 180 + B following habituation
on 180, it is of interest to observe the results in the second and third cells of the first
row of Table 1. Following habituation to the 180 screen, the infants on average
look at the 120 + B event for 18.71 sec but look at the 180 + B for only 13.89 sec.
We see that there is a suggestion of a screen novelty effect here too, but this differ-
ence is not significant. We attribute the location of these means to the averaging of
the means for two different subgroups (see Figure 3) in which there were more in-
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FIGURE 3 Mean observed and predicted looking times on the four test trials following habit-
uation to the 180 screen alone plotted separately for infants showing a screen novelty preference
(n = 7) or a screen familiarity preference (n = 5).
fants with a novelty preference and fewer with a familiarity preference. This is
clarified in the following discussion of infant sorting.
Because we found it useful in a previous investigation (Bogartz & Shinskey,
1998) to sort infants with respect to whether they had a novelty preference or a fa-
miliarity preference, we decided to do the same type of sorting here. Infants habit-
uated to 180 or 180 + B were defined to have a screen novelty preference if their
average look to the test trials 120 + B and 120 was longer than their average look to
the test trials 180 + B and 180. Infants habituated to 120 + B were defined to have a
screen novelty preference if their average look to the test trials 180 + B and 180
was longer than their average look to the test trials 120 + B and 120. Infants habitu-
ated to 180 were defined to have a block novelty preference if their average look to
the test trials 120 + B and 180 + B was longer than their average look to the test tri-
als 180 and 120. Infants habituated to 120 + B or 180 + B were defined to have a
block novelty preference if their average look to the test trials 180 and 120 was lon-
ger than their average look to the test trials 180 + B and 120 + B. The regression
analysis was performed using coding that reflected these preferences. Thus, for a
given infant, the coding for the CS and CB parameters was either 1 and 1, 1 and –1,
–1 and 1, or –1 and –1. For example, an infant who preferred novelty for the screen
and familiarity for the block would have the coding 1 and –1. In all, then, the re-
gression analysis included an overall level L, a trial effect, an individual partici-
pant level for each participant, and the CS and CB parameters coded for novelty or
familiarity preference. (When the possibility parameter was included in the analy-
sis, all of the previously mentioned effects remained and the one possibility pa-
rameter P was added to the regression analysis.)
The predicted values shown in Table 1 are based on the analysis described pre-
viously with the exclusion of the possibility parameter. The observed and pre-
dicted values from this analysis for only the infants habituated to 180 are presented
separately in Figure 3 for the infants who had a screen novelty preference and the
infants who had a screen familiarity preference. (Note that although the two curves
are sorted by whether the infants preferred screen novelty or screen familiarity, the
curves are obtained from the regression analysis that used coding for both the
screen preferences and the block preferences.) For infants with a screen familiarity
preference, the Baillargeon et al. (1985) result is replicated: longer looking at the
impossible 180 + B event than at the possible 120 + B event. For the infants show-
ing a screen novelty preference just the reverse effect is shown.
To summarize, it is our interpretation that the familiarity preference subgroup
replicates the Baillargeon et al. (1985) results, and the novelty preference sub-
group gives the reverse finding because infants presented with the same events,
and even run to the same habituation criterion, can individually differ in the
amount of stimulus information they have processed. Those who have processed
the events less will prefer to look more at the familiar events. Those who have pro-
cessed the events more will prefer to look more at the novel events. In the
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Baillargeon et al. study there was a predominance of infants who preferred the fa-
miliar screen event. We believe that the overall means can obscure the individual
infant preferences and that individual parameter estimation with sorting into sub-
groups can help to avoid such obscuring.
As Bogartz and Shinskey (1998) noted, the separation of the infants according
to the sign of their parameter estimates requires some justification. The variation
in the sign of the parameter values may be simply variation around a mean value at
or close to zero. If this were the case, selection of the infants by the sign of their pa-
rameter estimate could be viewed as merely using deviations due to error to artifi-
cially create two groups that in fact differ only due to error. Bogartz and Shinskey
introduced a statistical test for deciding whether the variation of the parameter esti-
mates was greater than may be expected merely as a result of chance variation.
They determined what the theoretical variation of the parameter estimates should
be under the null hypothesis of chance variation and created an F test based on this
determination. Basically, the measure they used was the mean squared variation of
the parameter estimates from their own mean. The test they proposed is adequate
as long as the parameter values do not cluster into groups of relatively homoge-
neous values that differ between clusters but not within. If this is the case, the
method they introduced assigns too many degrees of freedom to the variation of
the parameter estimates. In this context, we have applied an alternative method for
approaching the problem.
To show that the variation in the parameter estimates of the block and screen ef-
fects was greater than that due to chance, it is sufficient to show that each of these
sets of estimates covaries significantly over infants with the estimated total
amount of looking time on the test trials. This is so because the estimated total
looking time is the mean of the looking times on the test trials, whereas the block
and screen effects are estimated as contrasts of the looking times on the test trials.
Thus, for each infant, the estimators themselves are uncorrelated. For example, for
an infant habituated on the 180 screen with no block, let the four test trial scores be
denoted X180, X120B, X180B, and X120. Then, the estimators for the infant’s level CS
and CB values are obtained by (X180 + X120B + X180B + X120)/4, (X120 + X120B – X180
– X180B)/4, and (X120B + X180B – X180 – X120)/4. To see that these three estimators are
orthogonal, it is sufficient to note that the coefficients of X180, X120B, X180B, and
X120 for the three estimators are ¼, ¼, ¼, ¼ for the first, –¼, ¼, –¼, ¼ for the sec-
ond, and –¼, ¼, ¼, – for the third. Pairwise orthogonality is guaranteed by the fact
that the sum of the products of the coefficients is zero for any two of the three sets
of coefficients. Consequently, any correlation of the parameter estimates over in-
fants cannot be due to the form of the parameter estimators themselves but must be
due to real variation in the parameters resulting from their relation to some psycho-
logical variable.
Regression analysis revealed that the total looking time on the four test trials
was significantly correlated with the CS estimate (R = .714, F = 35.38, p = .00) and
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was also significantly correlated with the CB estimate (R = .368, F = 5.33, p = .03).
Showing that the screen and block parameters significantly covary with total look-
ing time reveals that variation in those parameter estimates is due to something
more than chance variation and justifies sorting the infants on the basis of their pa-
rameter estimates. The CS and CB estimates were uncorrelated (R = .105, F = .38,
p = .54).
Discussion
These results stronglysupport theconclusion that the impossibility–possibilityvari-
able isnotatwork in thescreenrotationexperiment.Theresultsalsosuggest thatpre-
vious findings of novelty and familiarity preference varying from infant to infant
need to be taken into account in analysis of looking-time data. Treating the individ-
ual preferences as free parameters estimated from the data is appropriate. Bogartz
and Shinskey (1998, p. 155) provided the reasoning, based on analyses of the crite-
rion method by Bogartz (1965), indicating why preference variation is to be ex-
pected generally when a habituation criterion is used. Still, it seemed desirable that
confirmation of such preference variation be obtained by experimental manipula-
tion. Our approach in Experiment 2 was to try to bias some of the infants toward fa-
miliarity screen preference by familiarizing them for less trials and to bias the other
infants toward novelty screen preference by familiarizing them for more trials, with
the expectation that results for those infants will be different on the test trials.
EXPERIMENT 2
Our approach in this experiment was to familiarize approximately one half of the
infants for only three trials and the remainder for seven trials. Approximately one
half of each of these groups were familiarized on the 120 event and the remainder
on the 180 event. Figure 4 shows the model for these two screen familiarization
conditions. We expected that whether the infants were familiarized on the 180 or
the 120 event, three familiarization trials would be more likely to yield negative
values of CS and seven familiarization trials would be more likely to yield positive
values. It was not so clear what to expect in the case of CB. On one line of thought,
no training with the block stimulus is the same whether there are three such trials or
seven in that if the block stimulus has never been presented, it will in either case be
just as novel when presented on the test trials. Alternatively, it may be that with
more familiarization trials, the existing representation to which the test trial event is
being compared may be stronger in some sense, in which case the effect of the pre-
sentation of the block on the 180 + B and 120 + B test trials may have a greater effect
on looking time.
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Method
Although we regard the methods employed in Experiments 1 and 2 as equivalent
for our purposes, we present them in detail because Experiment 1 was conducted in
Bogartz and Shinskey’s lab and Experiment 2 was conducted in Schilling’s lab.
Participants. Fifty-two infants aged 5½ months plus or minus 14 days partici-
pated in the study. All infants were reported by parents to have been born full-term,
with a birthweight greater than 2,500 g and at the time to be in good health. Nine addi-
tional infants were dropped because of fussiness or failure to complete all of the test-
ing trials. One of these was due to a camera malfunction. All infants were tested at the
Infant Studies Laboratory at Franklin and Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylva-
nia. Names of parents and infants were obtained from public birth announcements
listed in a local newspaper. The parents of potential participants were mailed a letter
that explained the general nature of the procedure. Parents were asked to mail an en-
closed postcard indicating a willingness to become members of a pool of potential
participants. During a lab visit, parents signed a consent form that explained the na-
ture of the procedure and advised the parents of their right to terminate their infants’
participation at any time without any questions asked. After a testing session, all par-
ents were debriefed as to the purpose of the study, given an opportunity to ask ques-
tions, and the infants were given a T-shirt and certificate for their participation.
Stimuli and apparatus. The moving screen was a white, foam core screen,
20.3 cm long × 18.4 cm high, situated on a black box 38.1 cm long × 10.8 cm high ×
22.9 cm wide. The block (18 cm long × 10 cm high × 1 cm thick) had black and
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FIGURE 4 The model for Experiment 2, ignoring the expected variation in CS depending on
how many familiarization trials are given. Note. L = the general level of looking; CS = the ef-
fect of a change in the screen rotation condition from 180 on habituation to 120 on test or vice
versa; –CS = the effect of no change; CB = the effect of a change in the block condition from
presence of block during habituation to absence of block during test or vice versa; –CB = the ef-
fect of no change.
white checkerboard stripes and was large enough so that the screen would hit it if
the screen progressed any further than 120°. In addition, movement of the block
was controlled by an experimenter who used a lever to raise and lower the block. To
raise the block, the experimenter pulled a string that lifted the block from the rear
base of the apparatus. To lower the block, the experimenter released the string and
the block then rested flush with the apparatus. This experimenter was able to raise
and lower the block while positioned behind the rear center panel (from the infant’s
point of view) of a four-sided screen that sat on the same table as the apparatus.
There was a small hole in the lower right corner of the rear center screen through
which an experimenter could see the screen movement. Attached to either side of
the center panel were two blinders that prevented infants from seeing the experi-
menters and the rest of the lab room. In front of the infants was a curtain that could
be opened and closed by the experimenter behind the rear center screen. While the
curtain was closed, infants could no longer see the apparatus.
The movement of the screen was controlled by a Cybermation SCK–2000 con-
troller kit. The controller card was mounted underneath the black base of the mov-
ing screen. The moving screen was run by a 12-V AC Center Tap, 4 amp
transformer that powered a 12-V stepper motor. Software for an IBM computer al-
lowed the parameters of speed and movement and degrees of arc of the screen to be
set prior to the start of a trial.
The length of trials and looking data were recorded by a computer. The soft-
ware cued the experimenter when to begin a trial, when to end a trial, and when a
specific number of trials had been reached. All testing sessions were videotaped by
a Sony Camcorder video camera that recorded a direct view of the infants’ gazes to
the screen. All data were copied from the 8 mm camcorder tape onto VHS VCR
tapes with a timer image superimposed on every frame in .01 sec.
Procedure. The infants were seated in a car seat during the entire procedure.
The parents were seated next to the infants to the right of the right blinder. This ar-
rangement allowed parents and infants to see each other without permitting parents
to view the apparatus. Before familiarization trials started, parents were reminded
not to interact with the infants while the curtain was open. After a trial ended and the
curtains were closed, parents were permitted to gently pat or talk to a fussy infant
during the intertrial period.
Three experimenters participated in the procedure. In an adjacent control room,
Experimenter 1 scored looking time from a video monitor and Experimenter 2 ini-
tiated and terminated the screen movement at the beginning and end of a trial. Ex-
perimenter 3 opened and closed the curtains at the beginning and end of a trial.
Experimenter 3 was cued when to open and close the curtains by Experimenter 1
via headphones. Finally, Experimenter 3 raised and lowered the block attached to
the apparatus. This block served as the obstacle in the path of the moving screen
during the test trials. A trial started with a single button press on the keyboard by
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Experimenter 2, which in turn activated the moving screen to begin its arc. Once a
trial began, Experimenter 1 began scoring by hitting a key on a keyboard that was
connected to the Macintosh computer.
Infants were randomly placed into a group that received either three 180° (n =
11), three 120° (n = 14), seven 180° (n = 14), or seven 120° (n = 13) familiarization
trials. Infants in all groups received four test trials: 180, 120, 180 + B, and 120 + B.
The four test trials were presented in random order determined individually before
the start of the procedure. A trial began with a .1-sec fixation to the screen and con-
tinued until the infants accumulated 5 consecutive sec of looking time at the
screen. If an infant looked away for 2 consecutive sec after the accumulation crite-
rion was met, then the trial ended. Otherwise, a trial ended after the infant accumu-
lated 60 sec of looking time at the screen. During all trials, the screen moved
through its arc (i.e., 180 or 120, block or no block) at a rate of 45° per sec.
Scoring. All trials from all participants were scored several times. Initially,
all infants were scored live during the testing session. Online scoring was necessary
because the computer controlled trial length based on accumulated looking time.
One experimenter watched a video monitor that recorded the infants’ gazes and the
apparatus. This experimenter (who was not blind to condition) could hit keys on a
keyboard that recorded the looking time of each gaze. All participants’ data were
also scored from videotapes. Two independent scorers used a VCR that has a shut-
tle control to score the videotapes. This shuttle enabled the scorer to stop the tape at
precisely the point at which a look began and to advance the tape to the point at
which the look had terminated. Each scorer was blind to the type of trial being pre-
sented. This was possible because for each rotation, only the first 45° of the screen
movement as the screen went through the first part of its rise and last 45° of the
screen movement as the screen returned to its initial position were videotaped. Be-
cause the event distinguishing the trial type, 120 versus 180 and block versus no
block, occurred after the screen had risen 45° and before it descended the final 45°,
the scorer could not know what type of trial was occurring.
The scorers began each trial to make sure the infants had accumulated 5 consec-
utive sec of looking time at the apparatus at the start of each trial. Each scorer
marked the time that an infant began a directed gaze at the apparatus, then ad-
vanced the tape, and marked the time when the infants stopped looking at the appa-
ratus. The scorers then advanced the tape through the nonlooking interval to make
sure that 2 consecutive sec of nonlooking had not elapsed. This scoring procedure
continued for each looking and nonlooking period on every trial for each infant.
If a scorer found that an infant had not accumulated 5 consecutive sec at the start
of a trial, the infant’s data were dropped. Also, an infant’s data were eliminated if a
scorer found that an infant had actually looked away from the apparatus for more
than 2 consecutive sec and the experimenter failed to terminate the trial. The data
from the two scorers were compared using Pearson’s correlation coefficient.
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Results
Interobserver reliability. Ten of the infants were selected at random.
Interobserver reliability was assessed by determining the correlation between the
judgments of total looking time on each training trial and each test trial by two
judges. The first observer was Thomas S. Schilling and the second observer was an
undergraduate assistant who was blind to the hypotheses of the experiment and to
the trial type. The correlation was .998, the slope of the regression line was 1.009,
and the intercept was –0.041, indicating that the two observers were judging the
looking times virtually identically.
Participant parameter tests. The primary purpose of this experiment was
to use the model predictions to show that the preference effects could be experi-
mentally affected and that the model parameters would properly reflect this varia-
tion. To do this, an estimate of CS and CB was obtained for each individual partici-
pant. Let LT be the looking-time function such that, for example, LT(120 + B) is the
looking time to test trial 120 + B. Then, Figure 4 reveals that for infants familiarized
to the 180 event, CS can be estimated by [LT(120 + B) + LT(120) – LT(180 + B) –
LT(180)]/4, and CB can be estimated by [LT(180 + B) + LT(120 + B) – LT(180) –
LT(120)]/4. Similarly, for infants familiarized to the 120 event, CS can be esti-
mated by [LT(180 + B) + LT(180) – LT (120 + B) – LT(120)]/4, and CB can be esti-
mated by [LT(180 + B) + LT(120 + B) – LT(180) – LT(120)]/4. In each case, nega-
tive values of the parameter reflect a preference for the familiar event and positive
values reflect a preference for the novel event.
The estimates of CS and of CB were analyzed separately using in each case a
one-factor between-participant design with the factor having the four familiariza-
tion conditions 3–180, 3–120, 7–180, and 7–120 as its four levels. For each param-
eter, three planned orthogonal contrasts were performed. The first contrast tested
the difference between the mean parameter values at the two levels of number of
familiarization trials, three versus seven. The second contrast tested the difference
between the means for 3–180 and 3–120, and the third contrast tested the differ-
ence between the means for 7–180 and 7–120.
For the CS variable, the means for 3–180, 3–120, 7–180, and 7–120 were –3.44,
–4.27, .61, and 3.83. These means were significantly different, F(3, 48) = 10.45, p
= .00. The difference between the mean CS values for infants receiving three fa-
miliarization trials versus infants receiving seven familiarization trials was signifi-
cant, F(1, 48) = 26.99, p = .00. The difference between the mean CS values for
3–180 and 3–120 was not significant, F(1, 48) = .62 and the difference between the
mean CS values for 7–180 and 7–120 just missed being significant, F(1, 48) =
3.97, p = .052. The results clearly indicate that we successfully experimentally ma-
nipulated the CS parameter value by manipulating the number of familiarization
trials. This result strongly supports the argument that looking time on the test trials
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is determined by familiarity or novelty preferences for the screen rotation event re-
sulting from the relation between the representation of the familiarization event
and the perception of the test event.
For the CB variable, the means for 3–180, 3–120, 7–180, and 7–120 were
–1.96, –.54, .38, and 1.12. These means were not significantly different, F(3, 48) =
.38 and none of the contrasts were significant. The overall mean value of CB was
–.176, suggesting that on average, familiarization without the block stimulus pro-
duced neither a familiarity nor a novelty preference with respect to the block stim-
ulus. However, the mean square for error for the analysis was 54.61, suggesting
quite a bit of variability in the CB values. We are inclined to interpret this as sug-
gesting that for some infants the addition of the novel block stimulus produced
greater looking, in that those infants were further along in processing the rotating
screen component, but that other infants were still more involved in processing the
screen rotation, resulting in less attention to the block stimulus. Some support for
this conjecture comes from the fact that although the four group means for the CB
estimates did not differ from each other, they were nevertheless correlated with the
four group means for the CS estimates, r = .85, suggesting that the more the rota-
tion event was processed the more the block event became of interest.
Model fitting. Following the model fitting approach for Experiment 1, the
appropriate row of Figure 4 was used together with participant effects to model the
test trial data for each of the four groups. The models fit well in all cases. For groups
3–180, 3–120, 7–180, and 7–120, respectively, the proportion of variance ac-
counted for by the models was .797, .612, .706, and .561.
Graphs of the test trial observed and predicted values for the four groups are
shown in Figure 5. Inspection of these graphs and the results of a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2
mixed model ANOVA in which the between-participant factors were number of
familiarization trials (three vs. seven) and amount of screen rotation (180 vs. 120)
and the within-participants factors were amount of screen rotation (180 vs. 120)
and block (present vs. absent) reveals several interesting aspects of the data. When
the infants are familiarized for three trials, they look longer at the familiar screen
rotation than at the novel one regardless of which screen rotation they were famil-
iarized to, F(1, 48) = 14.44, p = .04. With seven familarization trials, this screen fa-
miliarity preference vanishes and the infants instead look longer at the novel
screen, F(1, 48) = 5.68, p = .02. When familiarization was seven trials to the 120
rotation event, the infants look longer to the novel 180 rotation events, F(1, 48) =
8.15, p = .01. When familiarization was seven trials to the 180 rotation event, there
is only a nonsignificant, slightly longer looking to the novel 120 events, F(1, 48) =
.22. One interpretation of this lack of a strong novelty preference is that the 120 ro-
tation is included in the 180 rotation and so is not so novel to the infant as is the 180
rotation following familiarization to the 120 rotation because the 180 rotation is
not included in the 120 rotation.
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Recall that Baillargeon et al. (1985) found that following habituation to the 180
rotation event, infants looked longer to the 180 + B event than to the 120 + B event
and that this was also found in our Experiment 1 for the infants who were inferred
to have screen familiarity preference. For the infants in our Experiment 1 who
were inferred to have screen novelty preference, the reverse finding was obtained.
Inspection of Panel A of Figure 5 reveals results that support those inferences. In-
fants familiarized on rotation event 180 for only three trials look longer at the 180
+ B impossible event than at the 120 + B possible event, but infants familiarized on
rotation event 180 for seven trials look longer at the 120 + B possible event than at
the 180 + B impossible event. This result clearly shows that experimental variation
of the familiarity of the 180 screen rotation event results in concomitant variation
in which of the two critical test rotation events is looked at longer. This result also
coincides nicely with the results of Cohen and Cashon (1998) and the results of
Schilling (this issue).
Discussion
Bogartz et al. (1997) and Bogartz and Shinskey (1998) found that infants did not
look longer to the impossible event than to the possible event during habituation in
their Event Set × Event Set treatments of the Baillargeon and Graber (1987) rabbit
study and the Kellman and Spelke (1983) split stick experiment, respectively. This
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FIGURE 5 Observed and predicted looking times on the four test trials following familiariza-
tion for three or seven trials on either the 180 event (Panel A) or the 120 event (Panel B).
result has been obtained again in our Experiment 1 Event Set × Event Set treatment
of the Baillargeon et al. (1985) rotating screen experiment. As these results accrue,
it becomes increasingly difficult to accept that infants know that the events are im-
possible and look longer on the test trials because of it, but show no signs of slowed
habituation to the impossible event. If the impossible event is surprising, why is it
not surprising when it is first seen? Surprise has always been an inference from lon-
ger looking as far as young infants are concerned. There has never been an inde-
pendent measure of surprise, such as facial expressions, to support that inference.
To the extent that the absence of longer looking during habituation undermines the
surprise interpretation, it tends to undermine claims based on longer looking during
the test trials. The notion that the infants look longer on the test trials because they
are surprised becomes less tenable, and therefore, so do the claims that the infants
have object permanence and the knowledge of solidity.
The fact that the novelty–familiarity comparison model is fitting well in Exper-
iments 1 and 2 supports our general approach and suggests that great care is needed
in interpreting studies that have habituated to only one stimulus event due to the
possibility of confounding of effects. Claims that novelty explanations have been
circumvented should be viewed with caution because this often is obtained at the
price of confounding a possible familiarity preference with the experimental vari-
able of interest. In this context, this observation is exemplified by the fact that
Baillargeon et al. (1985) assumed longer looking at the impossible screen motion
could not have been due to a novelty effect, because in their study the infants were
habituated to the 180° screen motion, which on the impossible test trial was famil-
iar rather than novel. Our Experiment 2 shows experimentally that longer looking
to the familiar rather than to the novel is possible. A similar concern arises for Ex-
periment 1 of the Kellman and Spelke (1983) study of infants looking at either a
solid stick or a split stick following their looking at a stick with its middle oc-
cluded. They assumed that if infants saw the occluded stick as a solid stick during
habituation, then longer looking at the split stick would be expected because it
would be the novel event. However, if infants preferred to look at the familiar
event instead of the novel one, then longer looking at the split stick on the test trials
may well be due to a familiarity preference (see Bogartz & Shinskey, 1998). It is
this ambiguity of interpretation that the Event Set × Event Set design is intended to
help avoid.
As Bogartz and Shinskey (1998) indicated, the Event Set × Event Set design en-
tails a certain kind of symmetry that is psychologically informative. The models
we have used have predicted that there should be no difference in test trial looking
time between being habituated to Event A and being tested on Event B versus be-
ing habituated to Event B and being tested on Event A. In this context, this symme-
try can be seen in Figure 2B. For example, compare the predicted value in row 2,
column 1 with the predicted value in row 1, column 2. The prediction is that look-
ing time should be the same whether habituated to the 120 + B event and tested on
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the 180 event or vice versa. This holds throughout the matrix of predicted values.
We have found support for this symmetry repeatedly in the past (Bogartz &
Shinskey 1998; Bogartz et al., 1997) and have found it in this study (see Table 1).
We believe that this symmetry is suggestive of the very type of comparison pro-
cess that we have hypothesized: namely, that the looking time is based on a percep-
tually based comparison of the test event with a stored representation of the
habituation or familiarization event. We know of no interpretation based on higher
level cognitive functions such as reasoning or logical inference that predicts this
symmetry.
This study shows again in both experiments the usefulness of recognizing that
familiarity or novelty preference can vary from individual to individual, as did the
study by Bogartz and Shinskey (1998). Experiment 2 in our study goes beyond
previous work in that it demonstrates by experimental manipulation that familiar-
ity preference and novelty preference are real phenomena in this type of experi-
ment and should be considered at the level of the individual.
The finding that the experimentally manipulated familiarity preference and
novelty preference for screen rotation produces the expected variation in the CS
parameter of the model provides a new level of support for both the novelty–famil-
iarity comparison approach to understanding young infant looking times and for
the Event Set × Event Set design approach.
A remark on the use of familiarization rather than habituation in Experiment 2
is in order. We wanted to manipulate amount of exposure to the events in the first
stage of the experiment to show that the parameter estimates were sensitive, in the
predicted way, to manipulations that varied the novelty of the test trial events. Two
options existed. Either we could try to use two different fixed numbers of expo-
sures for the two groups, thereby manipulating number of exposure trials, or we
could try to find a second habituation criterion to use. We had no way of knowing
with certainty which procedure would be better. It is obvious that the variability in
the underlying processes, over a group of infants, can be greater using habituation
or can be greater using a fixed number of familiarization trials, depending on the
initial distributions of starting values and of rate parameters governing the pro-
cesses. In the absence of information concerning the correct model and the distri-
bution of initial values, choosing between the two methods amounts to guesswork.
Our guess was that the familiarization procedure would do a better job of produc-
ing, on average, a difference in the parameter estimates, with less variability. The
guess was bolstered by the fact that about two thirds of the infants in Experiment 1
reached criterion in the minimum number of trials possible (six). It seemed that
seven trials should do a good job of familiarizing most of the infants and using less
than half that many trials should leave the infants with information still unpro-
cessed. The success of the experiment appears to have supported our guess.
This study shows once again that the previously used two-test design that famil-
iarizes on one event and tests on two others is inferior to the Event Set × Event Set
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design. The two-test design tends to confound familiarity and novelty preferences
with the effects of interest, such as possibility–impossibility, whereas the Event
Set × Event Set design tends to clarify the determiners of infant looking time. Fur-
thermore, the Event Set × Event Set design provides direct statistical tests that can
decide between the different hypotheses at issue and it also provides standard sta-
tistical methods for parameter estimation so that the contribution of the different
variables to total looking time can be directly estimated.
The results obtained by Cohen and Cashon (1998) are consistent with our find-
ings. They found no support for greater looking to the impossible event. Rather,
with their well-habituated older infants, they found a novelty looking preference
that is exactly what we would expect, given our results in Experiment 2 and the
findings by others that it is older infants with more familiarization trials that show
the greatest preference for novel events (Hunter & Ames, 1988; Hunter et al.,
1982).
Schilling’s (this issue) study was particularly persuasive in that he replicated
the Baillargeon et al. (1985) results but also showed that by familiarizing the in-
fants on the screen that moved through the same arc as the possible event, the in-
fants look longer at the possible event than at the impossible event, providing a
strong case for a familiarity preference effect for the screen rather than representa-
tion of the occluded object.
Meltzoff and Moore (1998), distinguishing between object identity and object
permanence, suggested that “younger infants are limited to anticipating appear-
ances based on the place or trajectory of the object when it was last visible,” as op-
posed to older infants who they assume “can represent an invisible object as being
in an invisible place or on an invisible trajectory behind an occluder” (p. 212).
Meltzoff and Moore attempted to account for the Baillargeon et al. (1985) Experi-
ment 1 result as follows:
In the violation condition the box is first seen stationary in a place. It was occluded as
the screen rotated up, and was absent when the screen lay flat on the table. Over multi-
ple trials, there were repeated disappearances and reappearances. Infants would be
expected to set up a representation of the box in place, especially after repeated expo-
sures. If this representation persists over short intervals, infants would expect to see
the same box, identified by its place, whenever the place is visible. When the screen is
rotated down revealing no box in place, there is a mismatch between perception and
representation. This discrepancy yields longer looking. Detecting the discrepancy be-
tween the pre- and post-disappearance scenes requires a representation of the past, but
object permanence is not necessary. (p. 212)
We find the approach of Meltzoff and Moore (1998) compatible with our gen-
eral approach. They emphasize, as we do, that young infants represent what they
have seen and compare what they are seeing with their representations of what
OBJECT PERMANENCE? 425
they have seen. Meltzoff and Moore’s explanation of the longer looking to the
180° rotation with the block may be partially correct but, given the results of our
Experiment 2, it cannot tell the whole story. According to their explanation, the
screen rotation during the familiarization stage plays no part in why the infants
look longer at one event than at the other, nor does the number of familiarization
trials. We have shown that both of these variables have strong effects on looking
time to the various events. A. N. Meltzoff (personal communication, September 1,
1998), responding to the previous statement, remarked,
We don’t think that the number of familiarization trials and the screen rotation “play
no role.” It is a little more accurate to say that our explanation cannot be the whole
story. As formulated, Meltzoff and Moore’s view does not anticipate that the screen
rotation and number of familiarization trials have such a large effect on looking time.
Rivera, Wakeley, and Langer (1999) also suggested that the screen rotation dur-
ing familiarization is irrelevant to longer looking at the impossible event. They
showed that infants would look longer at the impossible event even when no habit-
uation to the 180° screen rotation precedes the test trials. In a second experiment,
they showed that longer looking occurred to a 180° rotation than to a 112° rotation
even when no block was involved. They concluded that simple perceptual prefer-
ence for motion accounts for the results and that their findings question
Baillargeon’s (1987) claim that longer looking to the impossible event is due to in-
fant representational reasoning about physically impossible object permanence
events. The results of our Experiment 2 give no support to the hypothesis of a look-
ing preference for the 180° rotation. Rather, it is the type of rotation and the num-
ber of trials that determines which screen rotation is looked at longer on the test
trials. However, our results are not necessarily in conflict with those of Rivera et
al. In our experiments, we have shown a strong effect due to what happens on the
familiarization trials. In their experiments, Rivera et al. showed that with no famil-
iarization trials, infants look more at the screen that rotates more. It is plausible that
in the absence of any familiarized event, the processes involved in comparison are
less involved in looking and so perceptual aspects of the events themselves play
the major role in determining looking.
Important new theoretical work (Bogartz & Shinskey, 1998; Leslie, Xu,
Tremoulet, & Scholl, 1998; Meltzoff & Moore, 1998) is helping to draw more
clearly the distinctions that will be necessary in our attempts to understand the na-
ture of early infant knowledge and the determiners of infant looking and reaching
in situations involving occlusion. Some of the classic experiments (Baillargeon &
Graber, 1987; Baillargeon et al., 1985; Kellman & Spelke, 1983) that have been
widely assumed to demonstrate young infant representation of the occluded object
have been recently receiving experimental attention and consideration of alterna-
tive interpretations (Bogartz & Shinskey, 1998; Bogartz et al., 1997; Cohen &
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Cashon, 1998; Meltzoff & Moore, 1998; Schilling, this issue). This new work ef-
fectively calls into question the tenability of the assumption that young infants rep-
resent occluded objects in occlusion. The theoretical work by Leslie et al. (1998)
assumed such representation and may have to be altered to accommodate these
new results.
A body of work that to date remains as a bulwark in support of the assumption
of young infant representation of occluded objects is the work on infant arithmetic
(Simon, 1998; Simon, Hespos, & Rochat, 1995; Wynn, 1992, 1998). It is interest-
ing to note that Leslie et al. (1998) assumed such representation and included a
treatment of the arithmetic work from their perspective, but Meltzoff and Moore
(1998) assumed no such representation in young infants and did not refer to the in-
fant arithmetic work. From our standpoint, any approach that assumes that young
infants do not represent occluded objects in occlusion will have to explain the in-
fant arithmetic results. We are currently working on this problem.
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